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Abstract 
In the period from the 1990s emerging market financial crises until the North Atlantic 
financial crisis of 2008, the development of domestic bond markets in developing 
economies was a prominent agenda item in international financial reform circles. The 
crises of the 1990s drew attention to the vulnerabilities generated by frequently 
occurring double mismatches of currency denominations and maturities in the 
borrowing of emerging economies. This led to a series of reform efforts targeted at both 
increasing liquidity and the range of borrowers in domestic bond markets. In the 
aggregate, these efforts were successful: for emerging market economies as a whole, 
domestic debt now exceeds international debt. Moreover, domestic corporate bond 
markets have emerged in many countries, often for the first time. However, the nature 
of market development have been far from uniform, and has often not been in line with 
government aims. In this paper, we examine the interplay of government and business 
actors in market development. Drawing on 155 interviews with policy and market 
actors as well as secondary data, we show that the main explanation of variation in 
market development lies in the pre-existing structure of financial markets, 
conceptualised as a heterogeneous set of interest/influence constellations. 
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Introduction 
In the period from the 1990s emerging market financial crises until the North Atlantic 
financial crisis of 2008, the development of domestic bond markets in developing 
economies was a prominent agenda item in international financial reform circles. The 
crises of the 1990s drew attention to the vulnerabilities generated by frequently 
occurring double mismatches of currency denominations and maturities in the 
borrowing of emerging economies.1 Against this backdrop, domestic bond market 
development was seen as a key means to strengthen the resilience of financial systems 
in the developing world, resulting in a series of reform efforts targeted at both 
increasing liquidity and the range of borrowers that can access these markets.2 In the 
aggregate, these efforts were successful: for emerging market economies as a whole, 
domestic debt now exceeds international debt.3 Moreover, domestic corporate bond 
markets have emerged in many countries, often for the first time.  
 
At first glance, therefore, the explanation of domestic bond market development might 
appear relatively straightforward: the ‘original sin’ problem – an inability to borrow 
long-term in domestic currency - facing developing economies was widely recognised 
by international financial institutions (IFIs) and developing country governments 
themselves, prompting IFI-supported government initiatives which underpinned 
widespread and consistent market development to address the problem. Yet while the 
direction of change has clearly been in favour of development, there exist significant 
variations in the nature of market development across even the ‘emerging market’ 
economies – those countries which, amongst developing economies, enjoy the highest 
levels of international investor interest. This empirical puzzle in itself warrants further 
scrutiny.  
 
It is also of broader interest to those studying the interactions of business and politics 
more generally as it is precisely these interactions - constituted by a complex set of 
heterogeneous interests and influences - that shape specific market outcomes. 
Explaining variation, we argue, requires careful attention to the structure of domestic 
financial markets, and to the impact of those structures on incentives of governments 
and domestic financial market actors in supporting development. These dynamics, 
which we characterize for the period until the 2008 crisis, continue to shape market 
outcomes in the longer term. They are important to understanding when and how local 
bond markets are amenable to policy intervention, and call for a more nuanced 
understanding of the impact of financial market structure. 
 
In this paper, we examine the interplay of government and business actors in market 
development. Drawing on 155 interviews with policy and market actors as well as 
secondary data, we show that the main area of variation in market development lies in 
the pre-existing structure of financial markets. Structure determines the interests and 
influence of the dominant domestic financial actors regarding development. There 
exists variations in what they can offer government and thus the degree of influence 
they can exert.  
 
                                                 
1 For Latin America, see Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005); for Asia, Katada (2009). 
2 For an overview, see e.g. IMF and World Bank (2016). 
3 IMF and World Bank (2016: p. 7).  
 
 
Government priority is in funding the current account deficit if it exists, and borrowing 
on the most attractive terms. International preferences favouring development were 
consistent from IFIs and international investors over this period (from the mid-1990s 
until the 2008 crisis), This was the period when the ideas underpinning international 
attitudes towards market development were most consistently positive, before the 
financial crisis raised doubts (e.g. Kirshner 2014), culminating in IMF approval of 
various forms of capital controls (Gallagher 2011; Korinek 2011). This allows us to 
show how domestic interests and institutions shape outcomes even when international 
ideas and interests are consistent, but without challenging the potential importance of 
changes in international ideas. The influence of IFIs and international investors on 
outcomes varied depending on what assistance they could provide in funding the 
government and the current account deficit, which was in turn mainly a function of 
domestic financial market structure. We illustrate these claims by looking at four 
‘emerging market’ economies: Brazil, Lebanon, Malaysia and Turkey. Even in cases 
such as these, where we might expect international pressures to have significant 
influence, domestic financial market structure shapes variation in outcomes.  
 
Financial Structure: Constellations of Interests and Influence 
The political economy of domestic bond market development remains under analysed, 
but belongs within the rich literature on the integration (or not) of domestic economies 
with the international financial system. Historically, this literature has emphasised 
investigating the relationship between national governments and international investors 
and the extent to which various interest coalitions favour economic openness or more 
protectionist measures.4 Attention has also been paid to the question of how - and under 
what conditions - international investors want and do effectuate domestic policy 
change.5 A somewhat different approach was taken by work on the structural power of 
capital, with international capital, be it official or private, seen as occupying an 
advantageous position over national governments through its ability to exit investments 
or go on an investment strike.6 Along these lines, another strand of literature has 
focused specifically on the roles of IFIs in domestic policy change, for example through 
conditionality attached to crisis lending.7  
 
In a recent contribution to this journal, Young critiques the neglect of a deeper 
engagement with notions of the structural power of business.8 Importantly, he suggests 
that work on the structural power of business tends to ‘conflate hypothesized cause and 
effect’. To remedy this source of confusion, Young proposes to distinguish between 
structural prominence as a positional property and structural power as a relational 
outcome. The latter, then, can be measured in terms of ‘preference attainment’, for 
example by looking at how the preferences of differently situated (financial) firms are 
met at the level of policy reform. We see a similar conflation at work where it comes 
to interest/influence constellations; influence, in our conceptualisation, is conditioned 
by structure. In so doing, it is demonstrated by the ability of actors to facilitate or 
impede development at a given moment of time, for example by investing in specific 
products such as long-term bonds or withholding support for such investments. We 
focus on market outcomes rather than preference attainment in specific stated policies. 
                                                 
4 Frieden (1991). 
5 Frieden and Rogowski (1996); Mosley (2003). 
6 Gill and Law (1989). 
7 Vreeland (2003); Babb and Carruthers (2008). 
8 Young (2015). 
 
 
 
As is evident from numerous policy documents and statements, for the period of 
analysis, the interests of IFIs were consistently in further development. In the decade 
from the 1990s emerging market crises to the outbreak of the 2008 financial crisis, IFIs 
were keen to develop domestic bond markets as a ‘spare tire’ for times of market stress.9 
IFI influence can clearly vary depending on a country’s need for their financing, but in 
the cases studied here, direct IFI influence was small, and desired outcomes dependent 
on other actors. For the existing literature, the obvious other actors are international 
investors, whose interest is similarly consistently in market development, and whose 
influence lies in the impact their involvement in domestic bond markets can have on 
the particular government’s ability to finance any current account deficit and on 
government borrowing. As we will show, this impact can vary from negative to 
positive. The level and nature of international investor potential involvement in a 
country’s domestic bond markets can vary, but the variation in international investor 
influence is predominantly explained by a particular country’s domestic financial 
market structure.  
 
International investors can indeed have significant  influence on the financing of 
government debt or the balance of payments,10 but this influence cannot be measured 
solely be the size of debt or current account deficit on the one hand; or the size of their 
(potential) investment on the other. In respect of the balance of payments, we must 
consider the source of funding for any deficit not just its size. Where that funding 
depends heavily on debt portfolio capital (Turkey) pressure from the balance of 
payments for bond market development is high; where it is relatively dependent on 
foreign direct investment (Brazil), it is low. In Lebanon, the largest deficit of our cases 
is financed primarily by diaspora deposits in the domestic banks. For reasons explored 
below, this influences government against bond market development. This variation in 
the nature of balance of payments financing is an issue of market structure, as we will 
show. 
 
Greater variation in the potential attractions for government borrowing capacity of 
acquiescing to international financial market policy preferences also needs to be 
considered. We cannot simply assume that government’s with large borrowing 
requirements will support market development as a way of diversifying their investors. 
The Lebanese example in particular shows how high levels of government debt 
influences government against development, and both Brazil and Turkey similarly 
show similar narrower influences. International investors’ potential contribution to 
resolving the ‘original sin’ problem11 is particularly important for encouraging a 
positive attitude to development. The highly variable amount and nature of international 
investors’ interest clearly plays an important role, affected amongst other things by the 
absolute size of the market or economy, credit ratings and a country’s relative weighting 
in bond market indices.12 However, domestic market structure has a greater influence, 
because it determines the nature of the potential impact of international investors.  
 
The government in the case study countries plays an important role on its own as an 
actor in policy setting and influencing outcomes, not a mere reflection of sectoral 
                                                 
9 Rethel (2010). 
10 Abiad and Mody (2005). 
11 Eichengreen and Hausmann (2005). 
12 Sobel (1999: p. 158); Sinclair (2005); Hardie (2011, 2012). 
 
 
interests. We do not take a simple open economy policy model of policy formation, but 
consider government’s view of the impact of bond market development on the 
financing of the current account and of the government deficit as the key issues for 
government.13 In the case of the government deficit, it is necessary to consider 
Maxfield’s ‘revenue imperative argument’ of the desire to finance the fiscal deficit at 
the lowest possible cost and the ‘original sin’ issue of the desire to create the most 
sustainable government financing. For both government and current account financing, 
we must also consider what Brooks terms the ‘transitional costs approach’, the risk of 
short-term disruption as a result of market development.14 It is only once concerns about 
the current account and government borrowing are allayed that other policy options can 
be considered. An example of such policies is Malaysia seeking to establish itself as a 
global hub for Islamic finance.15 
 
Government is an actor in policy setting, but the varied interests and influence of 
relevant domestic financial market actors must be given equal weight in any 
explanation of market development. Governments can make policy regarding market 
development and influence markets markedly through their own borrowing activities, 
but government policy is not always even a necessary, and very rarely a sufficient, 
condition for market development. We consider different areas of finance in our case 
study countries, with a focus mainly on banks and pension funds, the key actors in our 
four countries. In the analysis of these domestic market actors, we are primarily 
interested in: (1) the interaction between financial market structure and the policy 
preferences of profit-maximizing financial market actors in bond market development; 
and (2) the interaction between financial market structure and the influence of financial 
market actors on government policy formation.    
 
The influence of domestic financial market actors can be seen in two areas. First, they 
lobby for their policy preferences.16 Second, independent of their lobbying (and more 
easily observable), the investment and trading practices of domestic financial market 
actors have a significant impact on market development. Despite the (varying) 
importance of international investors, no domestic market will be liquid and actively 
traded without the participation of a range of domestic financial institutions. This 
participation can be encouraged by government actions, including but not confined to 
liberalization, but not forced by those actions. The influence of domestic financial 
market actors primarily originates, as it does for their international counterparts, in their 
impact on government borrowing costs and sustainability and where appropriate on the 
current account.  
 
The structure of the market is important also to the strategic interaction between 
policymakers and financial market actors. First, concentration does not necessarily 
increase the likelihood of policy capture. Some large investors in all our countries face 
constraints on their ability to exit which can limit their influence. Second, market 
structure can result in policy options for government which are against the immediate 
preferences of market actors. For example, Brazilian pension funds favour short-term 
government bond investments, as a result of the country’s hyperinflationary 
experiences. However, this is a significant pool of financial capital which, in stable 
                                                 
13 For an early iteration of this debate, compare e.g. Frieden (1991) and Haggard and Maxfield (1993). 
14 Maxfield (1994: p. 586); Brooks (2004). 
15 Rudnyckyj (2013). 
16 Pepinsky (2013); Pagliari and Young (2014); Young (2015). 
 
 
times, should match its long-term liabilities with longer maturity government bonds. 
As discussed below, this encourages government in favour of market development that 
will encourage longer-term pension fund investments and reduce original sin.       
 
Domestic financial market actors’ interests lack the homogeneity of their international 
counterparts, and can vary from hostility to development, through indifference to active 
support. As with international investors they vary also in the impact they have on 
financing the current account and government borrowing, including the ‘original sin’ 
position their activities leave the government. An important further variable must also 
be included when considering domestic financial market actors: their ability to 
influence – to hinder or assist – market development. As we will show, large domestic 
financial market actors not only have the ability to lobby their governments in defence 
of their interests, but also have the ability to defend those interests by market actions 
(or indeed inaction).  
 
Financial structure thus constitutes a complex set of heterogeneous interests and 
influences, which we summarise in table 1: 
 
Actor Primary Interest Influence 
Governments Government debt and current 
account financing 
Strong; ability to set policy 
framework and award fiscal 
incentives. 
IFIs Consistently in market 
development 
Weak (mainly soft incentives 
such as technical assistance) 
International 
Investors 
Consistently in market 
development; emphasis on 
liquidity 
Dependent on role in 
government debt and C/A 
financing 
Domestic 
Investors 
Varied Dependent on role in 
government debt and C/A 
financing and greater ability for 
larger actors to promote or 
hinder development 
 
Methodology and Research Design 
We analyse domestic bond market development dynamics in four emerging economies 
located in the main regions of emerging market investment: Brazil, Lebanon, Malaysia 
and Turkey. These four markets occupy different positions when it comes to market 
development. The existing literature is divided between those whose dependent 
variable is government policy decisions and those who seek to explain various 
outcomes. Pepinsky, for example, considers policy changes with regard to the capital 
account and foreign bank ownership, contrasting his approach with the focus of Rajan 
and Zingales on the economic outcomes of international financial integration and 
domestic financial development.17 Our focus on an outcome – domestic bond market 
development – has an important implication for the nature of analysis. While 
government policy decisions remain central to any analysis of change, we must also 
include change initiated by financial market actors. Governments intervene to control 
markets, in particular in crisis conditions, but this does not justify an exclusive focus 
on government policy actions.  
                                                 
17 Pepinsky (2013), see also Young (2015); Rajan and Zingales (2003). 
 
 
 
Measuring any capital market development is not straightforward, and is typically 
achieved by considering size, using indicators such as amount of securities outstanding 
as share of GDP. For bonds, this implies unreasonably that more indebted countries are 
more developed. Trading volume is certainly generally higher in larger markets when 
size is considered in terms of absolute size, but the correlation between trading volume 
and size relative to GDP is not high. For example, Lebanon has a sizeable domestic 
bond market relative to GDP, but is the least developed market; bonds are typically held 
to maturity, little trading occurs and the range of instruments is limited.18 There exists 
no correlation between market size relative to GDP and market turnover in domestic 
bond markets in World Bank data.19 All other things being equal, ‘[s]ize breeds 
liquidity’,20 but, as we show, other things are not equal. On its own, market size to GDP 
– measured as volume of bonds outstanding or trading volume – tells us little about the 
development of bond markets. 
 
Size across a range of market instruments (especially a range of borrowers) is indicative 
of market development, but increased borrowing, particularly government borrowing, 
does not in itself increase market development (although the government’s approach to 
borrowing can of course influence development). Financial crisis-induced borrowing 
by western governments, for example, has not increased government bond market 
development. A more useful way to understand bond market development is to move 
away from individual measures of market size and towards seeing it as a process that 
has as its endpoint a ‘complete’ market in which all risks can be traded. While this is a 
theoretical construct, as markets cannot be completed, such an approach recognizes that 
market development involves both the range of financial instruments available to trade 
(asset structure) and the ability to transact (market liquidity).    
 
There are a number of ways to measure the range of instruments available to trade. We 
could consider, for example, the broad range of increasingly complex types of bonds 
that have emerged as a result of financial innovation, many of which readers have seen 
discussed in post-mortems on the 2008-2009 financial crisis. There are good reasons to 
avoid such an approach, however. One reason is the empirical problems of identifying 
genuinely different types of bonds amongst the supposed innovations. A second reason 
is that much financial innovation can be cyclical rather than secular: the disappearance 
of various complex securitization products after 2008 did not represent a reduction in 
US bond market development.  
 
We therefore use a simpler approach, looking at whether there are a sufficient range of 
different types of borrowers – governments, financial institutions and non-financial 
companies – in particular markets with outstanding issuance in excess of 5 percent of 
GDP. While this is a crude measure of the ability of traders and investors to buy and 
sell bonds (or trade risk) for a range of borrowers, it also has the added value of making 
a more direct link with development through a greater capacity for a broader range of 
entities to borrow. 
 
At the 2008 cut off date, there clearly exist significant differences across the countries 
analysed (see table 2). The Brazilian market is highly liquid (mainly thanks to the 
                                                 
18 Hardie (2012). 
19 As discussed in Rethel and Hardie (2017). 
20 IMF (2001: p. 101). 
 
 
futures and options market), but there is not the full range of government, financial and 
non-financial corporation bonds in meaningful size (domestic corporate bonds are only 
1 percent of GDP). Malaysia, in contrast, has the full range of issuers, but a significantly 
lower level of trading activity. Turkey’s trading is similar to Malaysia’s, but it is 
concentrated in government bonds. Lebanon only has a government bond market (and 
it is large relative to GDP), but trading volume is very low.  
 
This remains a narrowly focused measure. In Brazil and Malaysia, for example, the 
availability of certain instruments, including floating rate notes and index-linked 
certificates, further helps investors to trade risk. We do not focus on the important issue 
of repo markets, although such assistance to market trading is arguably covered in our 
measure of liquidity.21  
 
Table 2: Bond Market Development Configurations22 
 
 Range of Borrowers Liquidity 
Brazil Moderate High 
Lebanon Low Low 
Malaysia High Moderate 
Turkey Low Moderate 
 
 
Our interviews with government and domestic and international financial market actors 
allow us to explore the attitudes and motivations of a wide range of the most important 
actors in the four markets, and their number allows us to allay concerns regarding the 
subjectivity of individual interviewees. Interviews represent a particularly effective 
way of accessing the details of the activities of financial market actors, and are used in 
conjunction with the empirical data available on each market. The focus of our study is 
a particular period, the decade leading up to the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, a 
time of heightened concern with the development of domestic bond market in 
international financial policy circles. This focus subsequently lapsed somewhat with a 
shift of attention to systemic risk factors in the quest for financial stability, making the 
financial crisis the most likely high-point for consistent levels of market development 
effort across our case study countries. 2008 can therefore be seen as a high point in 
international pressure for bond market development. 
 
In this paper, we trace how the structure of domestic financial markets impacts 
development outcomes. This, as always, raises the issue of the endogeneity of 
preferences, which risks becoming a question of how far back in time we look to explain 
policy decisions and outcomes.23 In our case, we seek to explain specific developments 
following the resurgence of emerging market investment in the 1990s. Earlier 
government policy decisions, such as regarding pension provision in Brazil (dating 
from the 1920s) and Malaysia (1950s), or outcomes such as the failure to control 
                                                 
21 Gabor (2016); Gabor and Ban (2016). 
22 Adapted from Rethel and Hardie (2017). 
23 See e.g. Milner (1997: p. 65). 
 
 
inflation in Brazil from the 1980s, are therefore contributors to financial market 
structure, but not the subject of explanation.24  
 
Financial Market Structure and the Development of Domestic Bond Markets 
In seeking to elucidate the constellations of interests and influence that shape market 
development in our four countries, we ask a series of questions: 
 
1. What are the incentives for governments in market development? 
The current account 
A country’s current account position is an important determinant of its policy options.25 
As figure 1 shows, the current account positions of our four countries exhibited a strong 
variation during the period under investigation. Lebanon had a very significant current 
account deficit, Malaysia a surplus and Brazil and Turkey lay between. If a current 
account deficit was in itself an important influence in favour of market development, 
we would expect Lebanon to have developed the most, Malaysia the least. In the case 
of current account deficits, however, we must also focus on the nature and context of 
financing. Brazil financed its deficit - before moving into surplus - in large part through 
Foreign Direct Investment, resulting in low pressure from the financing of the current 
account for market development. In contrast, Turkey had both a larger current account 
deficit in this period, and historically low levels of FDI (although the beginning of EU 
accession negotiations increased FDI markedly). Turkey therefore had to attract 
portfolio capital, representing a strong incentive to develop domestic markets to appeal 
to international investors, primarily by maximising liquidity in government bonds.  
 
Figure 1: Current Account as % of GDP, 1995-2007
 
                                                 
24 See Abiad and Mody (2005) on the importance of ‘a self-reinforcing reform momentum’. 
25 Haggard and Maxfield (1996). 
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database  
Lebanon similarly required inflows of financial capital to finance a far larger current 
account deficit. These are largely covered by remittances from its very sizeable diaspora 
population, which made annual remittances of up to 26 percent of GDP 2003-2007, 
largely through deposits in domestic banks.26 Post-civil war economic stabilization 
rested on effectively fixing the domestic currency against the US$ since 1993, a policy 
universally supported across the disparate political spectrum. It is combined with a 
constitutional commitment to the free movement of capital, a legacy of Beirut’s pre-
civil war status as an important regional banking centre. The acceptance of foreign 
currency deposits by the banking system is a similar legacy. It resulted in incentives for 
government not to develop domestic markets, because central to attracting diaspora 
money is the high yields on deposits and the stability of the banks. This required 
substantial investment in government bonds and market control to ensure bank 
profitability even during political crises.27 Malaysia’s current account surplus is also 
important, but in a different way. In removing the need for policies focused on financing 
the current account, it removed a constraint on Malaysia pursuing other market 
development policies, most importantly on the development of its Islamic finance 
sector. 
 
Government debt and ‘original sin’ 
A government’s primary interest lies in the ability to borrow sufficient amounts to 
finance their budget deficits, on a long-term basis in local currency: governments seek 
to avoid original sin; an issue of which, interviews suggest, emerging market authorities 
are well aware.28 When combined with significant levels of debt, and therefore frequent 
refinancing, this has a significant impact on government attitudes to market 
development, from positive to ambivalent to negative depending on circumstances. The 
degree to which government debt is a significant problem, and to which market 
development can be the solution, both vary. Our four countries vary with regards to the 
problem, again largely because of their respective financial market structures. Table 3 
summarizes the differences. 
 
Table 3: Government Debt / Original Sin, end 2007 
 Govt Debt 
/ GDP 
Domestic 
Maturing < 
12 months 
FX-
denominated 
or indexed 
Brazil 57.4% 30.2% 8.2% 
Lebanon 171% c.23% 49.6% 
Malaysia 40.1% 12.1% 7.3% 
Turkey 44.4% 31.8% 31.3% 
Sources: Bank Negara Malaysia Monthly Statistical Bulletin; Lebanon Ministry of 
Finance Debt and Debt Markets Quarterly Bulletin; Brasil Tesouro Nacional Federal 
Public Debt Monthly Report; Turkey Undersecretariat of Treasury Public Debt 
Management Report 
                                                 
26 World Bank (2011). 
27 In broadly similar situations elsewhere, we might expect also to see crowding out or repression of 
corporate bond issuance. However, in Lebanon the corporate sector was seen as over-leveraged, 
suggesting no lack of borrowing opportunities. 
28 E.g., Senior official, Ministry of Finance, Brazil, interviewed 6 September 2006. 
 
 
 
Malaysia has the lowest government debt, only a small proportion of which is short 
term or in foreign currencies: there is no original sin problem. Domestic financial 
structure explains the government’s capacity to borrow domestically and long-term. 
Investment in the government bond market is dominated by the Employees Provident 
Fund (EPF), Malaysia’s mandatory pension savings scheme. It mainly holds bonds to 
maturity and in 2000 held three quarters of outstanding government bonds.29 EPF is 
also important through its ability to play a mitigating role during periods of market 
stress in government borrowing, such as the Asian crisis.30 By purchasing bonds issued 
by Malaysia’s asset management company set up to deal with non-performing corporate 
loans, EPF acted as a quasi-lender of last resort.31 In addition, EPF means foreign 
borrowing has traditionally been low. Overall, the pressure for or against market 
development from either the level or composition of government debt in Malaysia is 
very low, with the same consequences for the ability to pursue other policies discussed 
above.  
 
In Brazil and Turkey, government debt is slightly higher, and in Turkey foreign 
currency debt is significantly higher than in Malaysia. Domestic government bond 
borrowing in both countries is also of very short maturity, creating a significant issue 
with original sin. As of end-2007, only 35.1 percent of Brazilian domestic debt had a 
fixed interest rate, and 72.7 percent of Turkish debt reset its interest rate within 12 
months. In the case of Turkey, the fact that much foreign currency borrowing could be 
sold to the domestic banking system as a result of highly dollarized domestically-
sourced bank deposits mitigates the problem somewhat. The Turkish banks can also 
assist government borrowing at times of market stress. However, minimum levels of 
investment by pension funds in government debt were set with an eye not only on 
prudence, but also on the government’s borrowing needs.32 Limits on yields and tax 
incentives have also been used to favour government over corporate debt. In Brazil, 
despite the authorities’ view of themselves as liberalizing, the need to refinance 
remained an important influence: ‘[t]he federal government’s gargantuan funding needs 
induces it to pass regulation favouring its own debt in detriment of the corporate 
financing market’.33 The need to refinance outstanding government debt, the result both 
of the size and maturity structure of that debt, supported development of the 
government debt market, but resulted in the government hindering the development of 
other domestic bond markets. 
 
This is also the case in Lebanon, except that many of the deposits originate with the 
diaspora, and in Lebanon banks also buy slightly longer maturity bonds. However, in 
Lebanon, the most significant issue is not the maturity or currency composition of 
government debt, but rather the size. This represents the main concern of the authorities 
in this area, but the important issue is the size of government debt relative to the ability 
of the Lebanese banks to finance that debt. This ability remains high, including at 
periods of potential market weakness, arguing against market development, as such 
development is both not needed to fill any gap between government need and domestic 
capacity to buy government bonds, and would undermine the control of government 
                                                 
29 Felman et al. (2011: p. 7). 
30 For similar actions by banks in both Lebanon and Turkey, but not Brazil, see Hardie (2011, 2012). 
31 Chief Investment Officer, Malaysian financial institution, interviewed 17 April 2007. 
32 Department Head, Turkish Treasury, interviewed 30 November 2005.  
33 Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva (2008: p. 45). 
 
 
and banks on which government borrowing ultimately depends: Lebanon faced a very 
significant transitional costs problem.  
 
  2. What do international investors offer? 
International investors favour market development, particularly liquidity in government 
bond markets. Other than the government, only a small group of large financial 
institutions or non-financial corporations are likely to be seen as potential investments, 
so their influence on the range of borrowers is generally lower. However, despite this 
consistent policy preference, international investors are also seen by policymakers as 
more likely to prove fickle in the case of market difficulties. International investors 
increase price volatility in government bond markets, which must be balanced by a 
positive impact on achieving government aims in undertaking market development.34 
We cannot assume such an equally positive impact across countries, or indeed 
policymakers’ expectations of any positive impact at all. The key variable in this regard 
is again the potential contribution to the current account and government borrowing, 
which is a function of existing market structure. 
 
Turkey enjoyed the highest level of foreign ownership across our countries. The 
beginning of membership talks between Turkey and the EU in 2005 increased interest 
in Turkish debt, but more fundamentally, as a large issuer amongst emerging markets, 
Turkey represents a high proportion of indices measuring the performance of emerging 
market local currency debt. This increases international investor demand and reduces 
the likelihood of the sudden reversal of these flows.35 Turkey also has the highest 
requirement for foreign portfolio capital. International investors also offer an 
opportunity to deal with the ‘original sin’ problem that is a legacy from high inflation 
and political instability. A Turkish Treasury official estimated that 80 – 85 percent of 
the first auction of five-year government bonds was sold to international investors. The 
successful issuance and subsequent price performance of these longer maturity 
securities then encourages domestic interest.36  
 
This willingness to buy longer-dated government bonds makes international investors 
attractive to the Turkish government beyond the volume of their investment. The 
incentive for the Turkish government to meet international investors’ desire for market 
development was high; however, the relatively small size of domestic pension and 
insurance funds meant that the extension of maturity by domestic investors relies on 
banks, and is therefore limited by banks’ ability to take maturity mismatches. In contrast 
in Brazil, the potential of international investors encouraging domestic maturity 
extension is greater because it is complemented by the large domestic pension funds.  
 
The history of high inflation in Brazil created an original sin problem very similar to 
the Turkish case in terms of maturity profiles. All types of domestic investor preferred 
short term investments linked to market rates. This resulted in a high sensitivity of the 
government’s debt levels to market movements, as illustrated most graphically before 
Lula’s 2002 presidential election victory.37 However, Brazil’s different financial 
structure increases the attraction of foreign investors because of the extensive pension 
                                                 
34 Andritzky (2012). 
35 Hardie (2012). 
36 Department Head, Turkish Treasury, interviewed 1 December 2005. 
37 Hardie (2006). 
 
 
system.38 In Brazil, the domestic pension funds not only could, but for liability-
matching reasons arguably should buy long term government bonds to match their long-
term liabilities, and they already had sizeable funds invested in government bonds. The 
immediate pay-off for the Brazilian authorities of international investor involvement is 
high, despite relatively low pressure from the current account and low levels of 
international investment, because international investors will buy longer maturity 
bonds, and because of the potential for longer maturity pension fund investment to help 
address the original sin problem. This results in a high incentive for the Brazilian 
government to develop their domestic bond market in line with international investor 
preferences. 
 
In contrast, during our period of observation, international investors offered only 
moderate incentives related to the current account or government borrowing for the 
Malaysian government to move towards further market development, because neither 
the current account or government borrowing were a major concern. Given Malaysia’s 
imposition of capital outflow controls in 1998, these investors showed only limited 
interest in the Malaysian market for most of the period under analysis anyway.39 
Malaysia was free to pursue other development objectives such as the development of 
its Islamic finance sector. Interest in the Malaysian market did resume in the early 
2000s, but was mainly driven by Malaysia’s expanding Islamic finance sector. 
International investors interested in Islamic finance give an incentive to increase the 
range of issuers. The appetite for new Islamic structures was high, indicated by the 
oversubscription of new government and corporate issues.40 Nevertheless, these 
changes with regard to the Malaysian bond market were not specifically aimed at 
increased turnover, and Islamic restrictions on the sale of debt provide further 
impediments. The development of market liquidity was slow to keep pace with the 
increased range of financial instruments, resulting in a different form of market 
development from Brazil and Turkey. 
  
In Lebanon, international investors provide a disincentive to market development. As a 
small country, international interest is anyway likely to be limited and sporadic, but the 
structure of the financial system in Lebanon is such as to make the interest a potential 
negative. The captive bank buyers of Lebanese debt meant Lebanese yields have 
historically been far lower than the country’s weak credit rating would imply, despite 
its exceptional debt to GDP ratio. ‘We will not buy this credit because it should yield 
more’ summarizes the attitude of international investors.41 If these investors had taken 
a view on Lebanon, many of them would likely have done so through short positions, 
pressuring yields higher. The frequency of political uncertainty in the country means 
there is a strong possibility of periods of negative news. International investors 
therefore represented a threat, not an opportunity, and are a negative influence on the 
government’s incentive to develop the bond markets. 
 
                                                 
38 Pension fund assets were about 16 percent of GDP in 2004 (Borensztein et al. 2007). 
39 Director, Malaysian research institute, interviewed 18 March 2008. At end-2001, foreign investors 
held only 0.3% of total outstanding bonds, a share which increased to 14.7% as at end of 2007 (BNM 
2008: p. 74).   
40 Head Treasury, Malaysian financial institution, interviewed 25 March 2013. 
41 Fund manager, London, interviewed 16 February 2006. 
 
 
3. Who are the dominant domestic financial market actors, and what is their role in 
market development? 
Brazil stands out amongst our cases in having in this period the full range of domestic 
financial institutions, including banks, pension, mutual and hedge funds. The key actors 
are, however, the banks (who also own the largest mutual funds) and the pension funds. 
The government bond market, particularly thanks to the futures and options market 
established in 1986, is highly liquid, though short-term. The BM&F’s early growth was 
both assisted by the hedging of inflation risk and opposed by the Brazilian 
government.42 This key part of the market structure had an influence on how market 
participants seek profits and therefore see their interests, with involvement of the local 
banks in the market being broad. They own government bonds far in excess of their 
(unusually high) regulatory requirements, and are the leading traders. Data on the 
accounting choices of Brazilian banks, in addition to interview evidence, suggest that 
both private and state-owned Brazilian banks are more trading-oriented than their 
Turkish counterparts.43 The greater trading sophistication of the Brazilian banks also 
means they have less to fear from the competition from international bank entrants than 
their counterparts in countries such as Turkey.44   
 
Brazilian banks also dominate the mutual fund industry. Brazilian bond fund assets are 
the world’s fourth largest,45 and are an important source of revenue that banks have 
sought to defend in small ways that undermine market development. Attempts to sell 
government bonds directly to individuals have faced a lack of cooperation from the 
banks, and the implementation of mark-to-market rules were resisted to the point that 
one large bank boycotted a government bond auction.46 On balance, Brazilian banks 
are nevertheless supportive of market development. Bank treasuries and government 
bond market dealers are focused in their discussions with the authorities on achieving 
maximum liquidity in the market.47 They share these views with the important Brazilian 
hedge fund community. Banks have also been supportive of greater foreign investor 
involvement in the market to a greater extent than in other case study countries, for 
example through BEST Brazil, ‘an initiative aiming at promoting the Brazilian capital 
and financial markets to the international community’. This is supported by the 
government, and its sponsors include ANDIMA, which represents a range of 
institutions in the Brazilian financial markets, and FEBRABAN, the federation of banks 
in Brazil.48  
 
The banks are the dominant financial market actors in Brazil, but, as noted above, much 
of the incentives for market development for the government results from changing the 
short-term investment practices of the pension funds. Even when looking long-term, 
pension funds have not seen all market development as in their interests. As ‘buy and 
                                                 
42 Senior official, BM&F, interviewed 1 September 2006. 
43 Hardie (2012). Emerging market debt trader, London, interviewed 18 February 2005; Hedge fund 
manager, London, interviewed 23 June 2005 
44 Brazilian hedge fund manager, interviewed 31 August 2006.. 
45 As at end 2005; see also www.bestbrazil.org.br/pages/publications/cvm/CVM_Presentation.pdf, 
accessed 2 May 2007. 
46 Senior official, Ministry of Finance, Brazil, interviewed 6 September 2006; adviser, Central Bank of 
Brazil, interviewed 5 September 2006; senior official, Ministry of Finance, Brazil, interviewed 6 
September 2006; Head of Trading, foreign-owned bank, Brazil, interviewed 4 September 2006. 
47 Senior official, Ministry of Finance, Brazil, interviewed 6 September 2006. See also 
www.andima.com.br/english/publications/arqs/andima_yearbook2006.pdf, accessed 2 March 2012. 
48 See also www.bestbrazil.org.br, accessed 15 February 2017. 
 
 
hold’ investors, they have less to gain from increased market liquidity.49 They have 
been more focused on bond issuance that meets their specific cashflow and 
benchmarking needs and lobbied for corresponding coupon and amortization payments, 
and inflation calculations, and therefore against the homogeneity of instruments that 
would facilitate trading.50  
 
In Turkey, banks differ from their Brazilian counterparts in seeing international 
investors as almost exclusively accessing the market through the foreign investment 
banks, without domestic banks benefitting. Turkish banks have in the past been major 
beneficiaries of a narrow banking model that depended heavily on the taking of deposits 
and investment in government bonds. At the time of interviewing, various factors were 
changing this business model, even as the creditworthiness of the Turkish government 
was improving. First, and most important, is increased investment in ‘real banking’, 
which dates in the main from 2003.51 It includes increased competition for deposits, but 
more importantly, lending to businesses and individuals. A significant influence on this 
activity has come from foreign commercial banks looking to buy or invest in their 
Turkish counterparts, and preferring those banks that do not depend on investment in 
government securities.52 It also reflects, however, reduced profitability from investment 
in government bonds as yields have fallen with greater macroeconomic stability.53 
Second, some (private actor driven) market innovations were increasing the ability of 
Turkish banks to hedge their risk, including credit default swaps.54 This ability had not 
developed to the extent of Brazil, however. 
 
For the Turkish banks, the further development of the government bond markets is 
something of a double-edged sword. They are unlikely to be the intermediaries for 
foreign investment into the market, and international investors are ‘an unknown’.55 As 
in Lebanon, banks carry very large bond positions, and are therefore vulnerable to price 
falls they fear the exit of foreign investors would make more likely.56 The larger banks 
are making strong returns from ‘flow business’ – the buying and selling of securities – 
in government markets, and if activity increases, so should these returns. However, the 
large banks are ‘trading more like real money managers’, with a constant long position 
in government bonds.57 This means low volatility is attractive and control important.58 
It also acts as a brake on any increase in trading activity. During the period under 
observation, other potentially important domestic financial market actors were not 
significant investors in government bonds, although the government introduced pension 
reforms. Importantly, however, the government’s borrowing needs are a significant 
factor in determining pension funds’ minimum requirements for investment in 
government bonds and maximum overseas investment.59 The extent of the pension 
                                                 
49 IMF (2006b: p. 104). 
50 Senior official, Ministry of Finance, Brazil, interviewed 6 September 2006. 
51 Head of Treasury, Turkish bank, interviewed 7 December 2005. 
52 Chief Economist, Turkish research institute, interviewed 5 December 2005. 
53 Manager, Turkish bank, interviewed 6 December 2005. 
54 Deputy General Manager, Turkish bank, interviewed 5 December 2005; Executive Vice President, 
Turkish bank, interviewed 7 December 2005; Assistant General Manager, Turkish bank, interviewed 8 
December 2005. 
55 Executive Vice President, Turkish bank, interviewed 7 December 205. 
56 Assistant General Manager, Turkish bank, interviewed 8 December 2005. 
57 Deputy General Manager, Turkish bank, interviewed 5 December 2005. 
58 Chief Economist, Turkish research institute, interviewed 5 December 2005. 
59 Department Head, Turkish Treasury, interviewed 30 November 2005. 
 
 
funds lobbying for market development has been for longer maturity issuance to match 
their liability needs,60 which very much matches the government’s own concerns, rather 
than the liquidity-hindering specifically-tailored issues sought by the Brazilian pension 
funds. 
 
A similar, though less acute, interdependence exists between government and banks in 
Turkey as in Lebanon. The banks, unable to exit thanks to the large volumes of 
government bonds they hold, would be very unlikely to allow a bond auction to fail.61 
There is less concern on the part of the authorities with directly protecting the banks’ 
profitability in normal times, but measures to support the banks are taken; for example, 
domestic US$-denominated bonds were issued in 2001 to assist the banks in closing 
the currency mismatch on their balance sheets.62 The banks also have less direct 
influence on government borrowing policy. Unlike in Lebanon, international investors 
are needed to finance both the government and the current account, and, as in Lebanon, 
Turkish banks have few choices other than domestic government bonds: ‘the prime 
minister can ask the chairman of banking association that if you are not purchasing T 
bill what are you going to do?’63 Turkish bank influence is therefore lower than their 
Lebanese counterparts. Overall, we see domestic financial actors’ interests in market 
development as moderate but increasing over the period studied. Their influence with 
regards to market development is similar to Brazil’s banks, but clearly less than the 
main market actors in Lebanon and Malaysia. 
 
Malaysia stands out amongst our cases in having a market dominated by a single 
financial actor, EPF, which is the single largest investor in domestic government debt 
securities. In 2007, EPF’s investments equalled more than 60% of Malaysia’s GDP.64 
About a third of its assets were invested in government bonds, with another third being 
invested in corporate ‘loans and bonds’. In combination with government-mandated 
asset allocation that favours a conservative investment portfolio (debt over equity, 
domestic over international), this gives EPF a very strong interest in market 
development as a means to broaden the range of investible assets.65 However, at the 
same time EPF has little ability, given its size and the buy and hold nature of pension 
fund investment, to take advantage of, or contribute to, increased trading. For market 
liquidity, the dominance of the EPF presents a hindrance.   
 
Second among the main domestic financial market actors investing in bonds are the 
banks. Regulated government bond yields prior to 1990, in combination with ‘captive 
demand’ due to regulatory requirements and a limited supply of government bonds 
during the fiscal surplus years of the early 1990s, created little incentive for Malaysian 
banks to adjust their portfolios and actively trade government bonds.66 Government 
efforts to develop the corporate bond market created incentives for domestic banks to 
become more involved in market development, but primarily with regard to expanding 
the range of borrowers and products. During the Asian crisis, the central bank 
                                                 
60 Department Head, Turkish Treasury, interviewed 30 November 2005. 
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62 Former senior official, Turkish Treasury, interviewed 30 November 2005. 
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64 Authors’ calculations from EPF and BNM Annual and Financial Stability Reports for 2007. 
65 Former General Manager, Malaysian bank, and government advisor, interviewed 9 April 2008 and 
Chief Investment Officer, Malaysian financial institution, interviewed 17 April 2007. 
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successively lowered statutory reserve requirements and introduced a new liquidity 
framework, with the long-term side effect of making more bonds available for trading,67 
but this has not overcome the limitations on liquidity as a result of the EPF’s 
dominance. Banks’ interest in profiting from the expanding Islamic financial sector, in 
combination with tax incentives, has also provided greater incentives for market 
development, in particular product innovation, but this is again market development 
that contributes to the range of financial instruments, not significantly to market trading.  
 
Overall, during the period of analysis the interest of the dominant domestic financial 
market actors in development in Malaysia was high for range of borrowers, but low for 
liquidity. The interest of both EPF and the banks in expanding the range of instruments, 
especially the range of borrowers, was, for different reasons, high, but the interest in 
increasing market liquidity is low for EPF, and only moderate for banks and other 
investors such as mutual funds, which at that time were only beginning to make inroads 
in bond investment. In terms of the outcome of increased market development, the 
crucial issue of market structure is the systemically dominant position of the EPF, 
which limits trading activity, while also reducing pressure for the government to 
enhance liquidity.  
 
Over the longer term, government policy can of course result in change. Reforms of 
pension funds in Turkey are discussed above. At the time of interviewing, Malaysian 
policymakers had begun the process of considerably liberalising EPF’s mandated asset 
allocation and adopting a more aggressive investment strategy. Moreover, EPF and 
domestic banks are no longer the only domestic investors with a strong focus on the 
bond market. By 2007, insurance companies were the third largest group of domestic 
investors in the Malaysian bond market, holding over 10 percent of government bonds 
outstanding and 16 percent of corporate bonds.68 Given the nature of their liabilities, 
however, like EPF they are mainly interested in broadening the range of investible 
assets and less focused on market liquidity. Despite changes, the implications of EPF’s 
dominance remain in place, and therefore the outcome of government policy initiatives 
in terms of market development are conditioned by market structure.  
 
In Lebanon, the banks are the only significant financial market actors, and their attitude 
to market development is negative. Domestic investors own effectively all the domestic 
currency debt issued by the government, and around 80 percent of the notionally 
international debt. The relationship between the domestic banks and the government’s 
borrowing is, however, one of interdependence. The reputation of Lebanese banks 
amongst the diaspora is very high, helped by the fact that the last time a depositor lost 
money was before the 1975-1990 civil war. A significant inducement to make US$ 
deposits with Lebanese banks rather than more highly-rated international banks is 
nevertheless the higher interest rates paid by banks in Beirut relative to banks 
elsewhere. In order to attract these deposits, Lebanese banks must be able to lend them 
profitably. Lebanese companies typically borrow in US$, because the interest rates are 
lower than in Lebanese pounds, but, as noted above, they are generally overleveraged, 
so limiting further lending opportunities.69 The obvious outlet for the US$ deposits 
received is therefore investment in US$ Lebanese government bonds.  
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Maintaining the level of central bank reserves necessary for the support of the exchange 
rate requires an interest rate on domestic currency deposits that will prevent wholesale 
conversion to US$, resulting in a balancing between appropriate domestic currency and 
US$ interest rates. The banks must also have profitable domestic currency lending 
opportunities, but here the options are even more limited. With limited corporate or 
retail lending opportunities and no offshore domestic currency alternatives, the choice 
is domestic Treasury bills or deposits with the central bank. The banks as a result owned 
over 75 percent of Treasury bills held outside the central bank at the end of 2007. 
Overall, over half the Lebanese banks’ assets are government bonds or deposits with 
the central bank. As with EPF in Malaysia, the banks hold securities difficult to sell, 
because of a market illiquidity that is the result of their own dominance of the market.70 
Lebanese banks also need continued issuance of government bonds to maintain their 
profitability and growth.   
 
The result is interdependence between government and the banks, and a potentially 
long-term ability to block international price signals. This is a key additional source of 
influence for Lebanese banks compared to their Turkish counterparts. Although 
Turkish banks are important to their government’s financing, Turkey borrows far more 
in line with its international comparators. Lebanese banks’ influence on the 
government’s borrowing capacity is therefore higher. In periods of market stress, 
government and banks in both countries can cooperate to maintain stability and prevent 
stress becoming crisis, to their benefit as well as the government’s.71 For the Lebanese 
banks, the incentives in further market development are there, in the opportunities for 
further trading activities and at least partial hedging of risk. However, they are 
outweighed by the potential loss of market control, both for themselves, and for the 
central bank, whose activities allow them to generate profits. Banks therefore want the 
continuation of a system where the central bank will not allow them to lose money on 
Treasury bills.72 It is attractive to them to continue the situation where ‘at the end of the 
day we are more in control of this market than any other international counterpart’.73  
 
The losses to the banks if Lebanon traded more in line with the yields of comparably 
rated countries would be very substantial, and unwelcome market, and thus profit, 
volatility would increase: ‘We worry about our bonds being held outside because 
whenever they worry about the situation, they will…drop the market heavily’.74 Banks 
therefore do not have an interest in market development. This results not only in little 
if any pressure on the government to develop the market, but also preventive actions by 
the banks. They will not lend bonds they own to other market participants (thus limiting 
short selling and the development of repo or Credit Default Swap markets), and will 
proactively seek to prevent international market actors from short-selling.75 These 
actions limit market development, regardless of the fact that they are in line with 
                                                 
70 Head of Treasury, Lebanese bank, interviewed 12 September 2005; Deputy General Manager, 
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government policy preferences. Furthermore, the dominance of the Lebanese banks in 
the market, as with EPF in Malaysia, is itself a hindrance to market development. We 
summarise the dynamics in the various markets in table 4. 
 
Table 4: Summary 
 Government International 
Investors 
Domestic Investors 
 Current 
Account 
Govt 
Debt 
Interest 
in Market 
Incentive 
to Govt 
Interest in 
Mkt Dev 
Incentive 
to Govt 
Brazil Low High for 
Liquidity, 
Negative 
for Range 
of Issuers 
High High for 
Liquidity, 
Low for 
Range of 
Issuers 
High for 
Both 
Liquidity 
and Range 
of Issuers 
High for 
Lquidity 
Lebanon Negative Negative Low Negative High 
Negative 
Influence 
for 
Liquidity. 
Low for 
Range of 
Issuers 
High 
Negative 
Influence 
for 
Liquidity 
Malaysia Low Low Moderate High for 
Range of 
Issuers 
(Islamic 
finance), 
Low for 
Liquidity 
High for  
Range of 
Issuers, 
Low for 
Liquidity 
Low for 
Liquidity 
Turkey High High for 
Liquidity, 
Negative 
for Range 
of Issuers 
High High for 
Liquidity, 
Low for 
Range of 
Issuers 
Low for 
Liquidity, 
High for 
Range of 
Issuers 
Moderate 
for 
Liquidity  
 
Conclusion 
Whilst in the aftermath of the 1990s emerging market crises, bond market development 
was a cornerstone of the international financial reform agenda, it is less amenable to 
direct policy intervention than is often thought. As we have shown in this paper, its 
success depends on specific constellations of interests and influence. The importance 
of financial structure in explaining progress with and obstacles to bond market 
development has a number of important implications.  
 
Bond market development does not follow a one size fits all schema. Its success and 
failure depends on the interest and influence of a wider range of actors than is captured 
by an analytical focus on the relationship between national governments and 
international investors. Importantly, this includes a range of domestic financial actors 
 
 
such as pension funds and banks, whose interests in and ability to influence market 
development can diverge, largely because of country-specific, historical factors.  
 
Similarly, on its own government policy is unlikely to be sufficient to overcome 
domestic vested financial interests, and is often shaped by these interests, through their 
importance to current account and government debt financing. Financial structure 
shapes the interests of market actors, the incentives for government and therefore the 
varied levels of bond market development outcomes. Understanding the reasons for the 
varied nature of development across emerging economies therefore requires paying 
closer attention to domestic financial market structure. 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
We thank Ben Clift and Ben Richardson and the two anonymous reviewers for their 
comments on earlier versions of this paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Abiad, A. and Mody, A. 2005. “Financial Reform: What Shakes It? What Shapes It?”  
American Economic Review 95 (1): 66-88. 
 
Andritzky, J. R. 2012. “Government Bonds and Their Investors: What Are the Facts 
and Do They Matter?” IMF Working Paper WP/12/158. Washington, D.C.: 
International Monetary Fund 
 
Babb, S. L. and Carruthers, B. G. 2008. “Conditionality: Forms, Function, and History.” 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 4:13-29. 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia. 1999. The Central Bank and the Financial System in Malaysia. 
Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
 
Bank Negara Malaysia 2008. Financial Stability and Payments System Report 2007. 
Kuala Lumpur: Bank Negara Malaysia. 
 
Borensztein, E., Yeyati, E. L. and Panizza, U. coordinators. 2007. Living with Debt, 
Economic and Social Progress in Latin America 2007 Report. Inter-American 
Development Bank and David Rockefeller Center for Latin American Studies. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University. 
 
Brooks, S. M. 2004. “Explaining Capital Account Liberalization in Latin America: A 
Transitional Cost Approach.” World Politics 56 (3): 389-430 
 
Eichengreen, B. and Hausmann, R. eds. 2005. Other People’s Money. Chicago and 
London: The University of Chicago Press.  
 
Felman, J., Gray, S., Goswami, M., Jobst, A., Pradhan, M., Peiris, S., Seneviratne, D.  
2011. “ASEAN5 Bond Market Development: Where Does it Stand? Where is it 
Going?” IMF Working Paper No. 11/137. Washington D.C.: International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
Frieden, J. A. 1991. “Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in 
a World of Global Finance.” International Organization 45 (4): 425-51. 
 
Frieden, J. and Rogowski, R. 1996. “The Impact of the International Economy on 
National Policies: An Analytical Overview,” in Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics. Edited by R. O. Keohane and H. Milner. New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Gabor, D. 2016. “The (impossible) repo trinity: The political economy of repo 
markets.” Review of International Political Economy 23 (6): 967-1000. 
 
Gabor, D. and Ban, C. 2016. “Banking on bonds: The new links between states and 
markets.” Journal of Common Market Studies 54 (3): 617-635. 
 
Gallagher, Kevin P. 2011. “The IMF, capital controls and developing countries.” 
Economic and Political Weekly 46 (19): 12-13,15-16. 
 
 
 
Gill, S. R. and Law, D. 1989 “Global Hegemony and the Structural Power of Capital.” 
International Studies Quarterly 33(4): 475-499. 
 
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. 1993. “Political Explanations of Financial Policy in 
Developing Countries.” In The Politics of Finance in Developing Countries. Edited by 
S. Haggard, C. H. Lee and S. Maxfield. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Haggard, S. and Maxfield, S. 1996. “The Political Economy of Financial 
Internationalization in the Developing World.” International Organization 50 (1): 35-
68. 
 
Hardie, I. 2006. “The Power of Markets? The International Bond Markets and the 2002 
Elections in Brazil.” Review of International Political Economy 13 (1): 53-77. 
 
Hardie, I. 2011. “How much can governments borrow? Financialization and emerging 
markets government borrowing capacity.” Review of International Political Economy 
18 (2): 141-67. 
 
Hardie, I. 2012. Financialization and Government Borrowing Capacity in Emerging 
Markets. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2001. The Changing Structure of the Major Government 
Securities Markets. Available at 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/icm/2001/01/eng/pdf/chap4.pdf, accessed 10 
January 2018. 
 
International Monetary Fund. 2006. Global Financial Stability Report: Market 
Developments and Issues. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund. 
 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank. 2016. Development of Local Currency 
Bond Markets. Overview of Recent Developments and Key Themes. Staff Note for the 
G20IFAWG. Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, The World Bank Group. 
 
Katada, S. N. 2009. Political Economy of East Asian Integration and Cooperation. 
ADBI Working Paper. Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute. 
 
Kirshner, Jonathan. 2014. American Power After the Financial Crisis. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press. 
 
Korinek, Anton. 2011. “The New Economics of Prudential Capital Controls: A 
Research Agenda.” IMF Economic Review 59 (3): 523-61. 
 
Leal R. and A. Carvalhal-da-Silva. 2006. “The Development of the Brazilian Bond 
Market.” SSRN, http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.935268.  
 
Maxfield, S. 1994. “Financial Incentives and Central Bank Authority in Industrializing 
Nations.” World Politics 46 (4): 556-88. 
 
 
 
Milner, H. V. 1997. Interests, Institutions, and Information. Princeton N.J.: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Mosley, L. 2003. Global Capital and National Governments. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
Pagliari, S. and Young, K. 2014. “Leveraged Interests: Financial Industry Power and 
the Role of Private Sector Coalitions.” Review of International Political Economy 21 
(3): 575–610. 
 
Pepinsky, T. 2013. “The Domestic Politics of Financial Internationalization in the 
Developing World.” Review of International Political Economy 20 (4): 848-880. 
 
Rajan, R. G. and Zingales, L. 2003. “The great reversals: the politics of financial 
development in the twentieth century.” Journal of Financial Economics 69: 5-50. 
 
Rethel, L. 2010. “The New Financial Development Paradigm and Asian Bond 
Markets.” New Political Economy 15 (4): 493-517. 
 
Rethel, L. and Hardie, I. 2017. "Bond Markets", in: Handbook of Globalisation and 
Development. Edited by: K. Reinert. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
 
Rudnyckyj, D. 2013. “From Wall Street to Halal Street: Malaysia and the Globalization 
of Islamic Finance.” The Journal of Asian Studies 72 (4): 831-848. 
 
Sinclair, T. J. 2005. The New Masters of Capital. American Bond Rating Agencies and 
the Politics of Creditworthiness. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
Sobel, A. C. 1999. State Institutions, Private Incentives, Global Capital. Ann Arbor: 
The University of Michigan Press. 
 
Vreeland, J. R. 2003. The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
 
World Bank. 2007. Developing the Domestic Government Debt Market. Washington 
D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
World Bank. 2011. World Bank Migration and Remittances Factbook 2011. 
Washington D.C.: The World Bank. 
 
Young, K. 2015. “Not by Structure Alone: Power, Prominence and Agency in American 
Finance.” Business and Politics 17 (3): 443-472. 
